The article critiques the anti-defection law introduced through the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution in 1985, which was designed to prevent legislators from defecting and destabilizing governments. While the law has succeeded in curbing horse-trading and ensuring political stability, it has also severely restricted legislators’ freedom to vote according to their conscience, debate independently, and represent their constituents effectively. The law mandates strict adherence to party whips, penalizing defiance with disqualification, thereby reducing legislators to mere instruments of party leadership rather than independent representatives. This undermines the foundational democratic principles of accountability, reasoned debate, and legislative scrutiny.
The authors argue that the anti-defection law’s broad scope stifles democratic deliberation and intellectual independence within legislatures, prioritizing party loyalty over individual judgment. They highlight that stability achieved under the law has come at the cost of meaningful parliamentary democracy, where legislators cannot dissent or deliberate freely. Reform recommendations include limiting the law’s application to critical votes affecting government survival, such as no-confidence motions and money bills, to restore legislators’ autonomy and enhance democratic accountability. Ultimately, the article calls for an amended law that balances stability with the essential democratic value of independent legislative thought and action.
