The article examines the doctrine of colorable legislation and the problem of horse trading in Indian politics, both of which undermine constitutional supremacy and democratic integrity. Colorable legislation occurs when legislatures enact laws that, while appearing valid, exceed their constitutional competence, violating Articles 245 and 246. Landmark Supreme Court cases like State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh and Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain have reinforced judicial scrutiny to prevent such legislative overreach. Meanwhile, horse trading—where legislators switch allegiances for personal gain—has destabilized governments despite the Anti-Defection Law under the Tenth Schedule, with judicial pronouncements attempting to curb this practice. Both issues threaten federalism, separation of powers, and political stability.

The article highlights the interrelationship between these phenomena, showing how legislative manipulation facilitates political defections and protects defectors, as seen in crises in Haryana, Arunachal Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra. It stresses the need for stronger judicial oversight and institutional reforms, including independent defection tribunals, strict adjudication timelines, and greater transparency in political funding. Ultimately, the study calls for robust legislative and judicial measures to uphold constitutional morality and safeguard India’s democratic framework against ongoing political opportunism and constitutional abuse.